Qubes QSB-118 is dated August 28. If qvm-copy-to-vm copies a file from dom0 to a qube that is already compromised, that qube can put a command into the error dialog that runs in dom0.

The qfile confirmation includes an error code and the last filename, as reported by the target. sanitize_remote_filename() still replaces anything outside ASCII printable, plus ", with _. Until bbba4b020ec7, dom0’s display_error() stuffed that string into a kdialog command and ran it with system(). The VM-side twin already used execlp. On current GitHub main, the sanitizer is unchanged and display_error() now calls execlp. The patch does not tighten the filename check. It stops talking to a shell. The installable Qubes 4.3 package is qubes-core-dom0-linux 4.3.22; the v4.3.22 tag is that source release. The bulletin says the package is still moving from security-testing to current. I did not run Qubes, and I did not exploit the dialog.